Introduction
Kurt Schneider, a German psychiatrist and a pupil of Karl Jaspers, pointed out certain symptoms as being characteristic of schizophrenia and therefore exhibiting a ''first-rank'' status in the hierarchy of potentially diagnostic symptoms. The ''first-rank'' symptoms (FRS) have played an extremely important role in the recent diagnostic systems: in the International Statistical Classification of Diseases, tenth Revision (ICD-10) as well as in Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder, Third and Fourth Edition(DSM-III-IV), the presence of one FRS is symptomatically sufficient for the schizophrenia diagnosis. At the same time, critics regularly claim that FRS may also be encountered in the nonschizophrenic conditions, and therefore, they are not specific or diagnostic for schizophrenia.
The current descriptions and definitions in English of the FRS stem from two principal written sources: the most original is the English translation of Kurt Schneider's Clinical Psychopathology (CP), 1 which influenced the second source: the very influential Present State Examination, a questionnaire developed in the WHO International Pilot Studies on Schizophrenia 2 and itself serving as a template for numerous other scales and questionnaires. Thus, the CP appears to be the only source available for the Anglophone psychiatry in its operational edifice involving the FRS. The term ''edifice'' here refers to the creation of post-DSM-II and post-ICD-8/9 diagnostic systems and criteria, used in most empirical FRS studies reviewed below.
The CP soon became popular among psychiatrists because it was brief, pragmatic, and seemed to reduce the complexities of differential diagnosis between schizophrenia and affective illness to a few rules of thumb. An even more brief version of CP, targeted at general practitioners, appeared in 1939. 3 CP may be considered to represent an ''operational'' modification of the perspective of Eugene Bleuler (and partly of Emil Kraepelin as well), who advocated the distinction between schizophrenia and affective illness by appraising the intersubjective adequacy of thinking, feeling, expression, and action. 4 A fundamental problem inherent in the specificity assessments of the FRS as well as in many other issues in schizophrenia research is the lack of a solid laboratory test of the schizophrenia spectrum disorders. In other words, in assessing specificity, we need to compare various conventions of the diagnosis to each other. It is, however, well-known from the poly-diagnostic studies 5 that the number of schizophrenia patients in the same sample may vary by a factor 2-3, depending on the diagnostic criteria and the composition of the sample (eg, the proportion of chronic patients).
The purpose of this review, therefore, is 3-fold: (1) to critically review FRS studies published in English between 1970 and 2005, (2) to emphasize in detail the methodological aspects of the 5 most frequently cited studies as identified in the Web of Science, and (3) to reconsider epistemological issues concerning the FRS.
Methods
The original data reports for the present review were selected from a PubMed search in January 2006, including ''FRS,'' ''Schneiderian symptoms,'' ''psychosis,'' and ''schizophrenia'' in the search phrase. Studies concerning the specificity of FRS and the relation between FRS and other variables were selected. Studies with exclusive focus on neurobiological structures were not included. Some studies assessed the diagnosis of schizophrenia by different diagnostic criteria. Here, the FRS were often included, yet without any attempt to single out their diagnostic impact. [6] [7] [8] [9] Consequently, these reports were considered less relevant and were not included.
Results
The reports included are summarized in table 1 with major characteristics extracted from each study.
Specificity
Only one study shows that FRS are specific for schizophrenia in the absence of an organic syndrome (table 1, no. 28), while another study finds that FRS distinguish non-affective psychosis from affective disorders (table 1, no. 36) . This contrasts with the 7 studies, which show that FRS occur frequently, but not exclusively, in schizophrenia. Thus, the FRS are also found in patients suffering from affective disorders (table 1, no. 4, 5, 7, 11, 18, 33, 35) . The FRS are reported to occur in 22% to 29% of patients with affective disorders (table 1, no. 3, 33, 35) .
Two studies find that although FRS are not pathognomonic for schizophrenia, they are nonetheless very strong indicators of schizophrenia (table 1, no. 28, 32) .
The majority of the reports conclude that FRS are not specific to schizophrenia (table 1, no. 3-7, 11, 12, 14, 16, 20-24, 31, 33-35) . Two reports suggest that FRS are also present in patients with personality disorders (table 1, no. 4, 6) .
Prevalence
Generally, the prevalence of FRS in schizophrenia is reported to range between 25% and 88% (table 1, no. 1, 4, 6, 15, 17, 23-27, 29, 30, 32, 33) . This range remains equally high in the reports from western and developing countries and in studies of different ethnic groups (table  1, no. 6, 15, 26, 30, 38 ).
The studies demonstrate very different prevalences for each specific FRS ranging from 0% to 66%. In some studies, delusional perception is the most frequent FRS, whereas the same symptom is the least frequent in other studies. A number of studies find no dominating FRS type. No characteristic pattern can be discerned across the studies (table 1, no. 1, 11, 17, 21, 23, 25, 27, 29, 30, 32) . Assessment of the diagnostic weight of individual FRS is absent with the exception of Mellor and colleagues 28 who suggest that ''voices discussing'' should be given less diagnostic weight than other FRS (table 1, no. 19).
Outcome
The majority of the reports conclude that FRS do not affect outcome (table 1, no. 4, 5, 8, 10, 13, 14, 22, 39) . One report concludes that FRS relate to outcome, however, in an ambiguous way; some FRS appear to be related to good outcome and some to poor outcome (table 1, no. 17). No study finds that outcome is related to the number of FRS observed in the individual patient (table 1, no. 13, 22) . A single study (discussed below) shows that FRS and ''poor prognostic signs''of Robin and Guze identify the same patients, and consequently, these patients have poorer outcome than the patients without FRS and with ''good prognostic signs'' (table 1, no. 2).
The relation between age and FRS has not been decisively established. One study reported that the patients with FRS were younger than those without (table 1, no. 37), another study found no relation between FRS and age (table 1, no. 5), and a third study found that the occurrence of FRS increased with the age of the patient at first hospitalization (table 1, no. 25).
The reports do not seem to support Schneider's claim that FRS confer a clear indication of schizophrenia when no organic syndrome is present. However, considerable problems of methods and design may be identified in the studies, inviting to a more cautious assessment of Schneider's claims.
Methodological Issues
The methodological problems identified in the studies are detailed below and tabulated in the last column of table 1 as outlined in the table footnote.
Lack of Definitions
Missing or unclear definitions of FRS is an obvious problem in 18 of the 39 reports (table 1, no. 2, 3 , 5, 7-9, 11, 13, 18, 20, 22, 26-28, 34, 35, 38, 39) . In 6 reports, no definition of schizophrenia is offered (table 1, no. 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 9). These are mainly older reports, written before the introduction of operational diagnostic systems.
Insufficient Sampling, Interview, or Rating System
When examining whether FRS are predominantly features of schizophrenia, it is necessary to examine whether the symptoms are found in the nonschizophrenic patients. Consequently, this question cannot be addressed when patient samples are limited to patients with the schizophrenia diagnosis, as is the case in 14 reports (table 1, no. 1, 2 , 5, 9, 11, 13, 17, 19, 20-22, 25, 29, 30) .
The lack of a phenomenological approach in the rating interview appears in 29 reports (table 1, no. 3, 4, 6-8, 10, 12-17, 20, 21, 23, 24, 26-35, 37, 39, 40) . This problem might have caused an insufficient eliciting and description of the psychopathological phenomena, resulting in doubtful FRS ratings. In 9 reports (table 1, no. 2, 5, 9, 11, 16, 17, 22, 25, 26) , the symptom rating is made from case notes thus potentially conferring important sources of error, particularly when the original interview was carried out without a specific focus on the FRS.
It would seem methodologically adequate that FRS are rated by an experienced clinician, yet this is not the case in 3 of the reports (table 1, no. 16, 33, 38) and in another 6 reports (table 1, no. 2, 11 -13, 24, 40) it is unclear who did the rating.
Lack of Comparison Within FRS
FRS may be divided into at least 2 clusters, 1 including the ''transitivistic'' symptoms (loss of ego boundaries) and 1 including auditory hallucinations, 1 but 17 reports lack differentiation between individual FRS (table 1, no. 3, 4, 8, 10, 11, 13-16, 18, 20, 31, 33, 35-38) .
Lack of Reliability Measures
The most frequent methodological problem in the 40 reports is the absence of FRS corating and measures of reliability: 34 of the 40 reports do not address these issues (table 1, no. 1-5, 7-20, 23-29, 31, 33, 35-40) . This may result in drifts in the interpretations of the symptoms and in the studies with more than 1 person rating; it is unclear if the symptoms are rated similarly. Furthermore, the lack of reliability measures on the level of individual FRS obscures the fact that certain symptoms are more difficult to rate than others.
Mixture of Illness Variables
A few reports fuse the assessment of several illness variables. In one study, as described above ( 
Frequently Cited Studies
A number of the cited studies of FRS are more than 25 years old, yet their importance cannot be overemphasized. A citation index based on data from The Web of Science shows that the 5 studies below are still the most cited studies of FRS.
Mellor (1970)
Based on a sample of 166 schizophrenic patients, Mellor 10 concludes that a considerable proportion of the schizophrenic patients (ie, 119/166) has FRS. The study exemplifies a frequent problem in the FRS research: as long as the schizophrenia diagnosis depends on the FRS, it is logically impossible to assess the diagnostic specificity of FRS. Although it is claimed that one aim of the study was to map the frequency of FRS in schizophrenia, 10 the subsequent follow-up article briefly mentions 28 (p184) that the original admission diagnosis was established if ''(the patients) had FRS in the absence of organic psychosyndrome.''
Taylor (1972)
Based on a sample of 78 patients admitted as schizophrenics, Taylor 11 concludes that FRS in combination with poor prognostic signs according to Robin and Guze (tabulated in Taylor   11 ) identify schizophrenic patients, while the patients without FRS were suffering from other illnesses. The study has at least 2 shortcomings: first, the FRS were rated from case note material, 11 which is a nonoptimal source for evaluating the presence of FRS. Second, and more importantly, only patients with the diagnosis of schizophrenia were included, which invalidates the assessments of the FRS' specificity. Moreover, it seems that the discharge diagnosis of schizophrenia was based on the FRS (unfortunately, the precise way of establishing this diagnosis is not described).
Carpenter and Colleagues (1973)
Based on 2 patient samples, totaling 165 structured interviews, the report concludes that the FRS are not pathognomonic of schizophrenia, but their prevalence is higher in schizophrenia than in other diagnoses. 13 This study has 2 major drawbacks: (1) the findings of the FRS in neurotic and affective patients and the manner in which these sensational findings are dismissed or sustained, and (2) only eight FRS were included in the study.
The results were extracted from interview data from 2 different subject samples with 103 patients with schizophrenia, 39 patients with affective disorders, and 23 patients having neuroses or personality disorders. 13 Two of the patients who exhibited the FRS were diagnosed with a neurosis or a personality disorder. Even by the DSM-II criteria, this should not be possible because psychotic symptoms rule out a diagnosis of a neurotic disorder. Nine affective patients had FRS, of which 8 were depressed patients having a cyclic illness pattern of unipolar or bipolar episodes. The case stories of these patients are selectively reviewed, and the authors conclude that their diagnoses were valid because ''diagnosis of past illness episodes were always affective disorders.'' 13 (p851). This seems to be an undue reliance on the reliability of past diagnoses, ignoring the frequent fact that schizophrenia has an onset marked by depressive symptoms. 50, 51 Furthermore, due to the unexpected finding of FRS in 8 manic cases, another selective review was performed on written statements of these cases. The authors concluded that the scoring in these cases were doubtful. The selectivity of the scrutiny and the presence of FRS in neurotic patients highlight the issue of whether the FRS ratings were valid in the first place. The authors avoid the principal discussion of where to draw the line between affective psychosis and schizophrenia.
With respect to the range of the FRS examined, it is worth noting that the ratings of delusional perception and voices commenting and voices discussing were not undertaken, while somatic passivity was scored, but the criterion of external source of the influence was left out. This problem seems particularly relevant because the latter FRS was more prevalent in the nonschizophrenic sample (2 patients with depression had only this FRS). While the reliability of the FRS is quoted to be generally good, 13 reliability depends on the FRS in question. Even the item voices discussing, which could be considered phenomenologically easy to score, has reliabilities ranging from 37% to 95% in the cross-nation International Pilot Study of Schizophrenia (IPSS). 52 Precisely this item was not scored in the larger sample of the study.
Taylor and Abrams (1973)
FRS were assessed as part of an exploration of symptoms, which might validate the diagnosis of manicdepressive illness. 14 The authors conclude that FRS are not diagnostically decisive when manic symptoms are present. This study has a serious diagnostic problem: The diagnosis of mania is based exclusively on scorings of affect and psychomotor speed, and it is dependent on the treatment choice by a clinician and the treatment response. The sample consisted of 52 acutely admitted patients diagnosed with mania because they exhibited ''hyperactivity, rapid/pressured speech, and euphoric expansive or irritable mood. '' 12 (p520) Patients with a history of or with symptoms of schizophrenia were included in this group if they fulfilled the mania criteria. 1, lack of phenomenological approach in rating interview; 2, symptom rating made from case records; 3, missing or unclear definition of FRS; 4, absence of FRS corating and measures of reliability; 5, few differentiations between individual FRS; 6, major patient samples limited to clinically diagnosed schizophrenic patients; 7, intermixing assessment of other illness variables also hypothetically described to accompany schizophrenia add to the confusion; 8, not rated by psychiatrist/psychologist.
None of the patients received a diagnosis of mania by the admitting physician. In fact, nearly all patients (N = 48) were diagnosed with schizophrenia. Of the total sample, 11.5% reported FRS in a semistructured interview. Yet, in the very first place, if the FRS are undoubtedly present, should the patient be diagnosed with mania due to simultaneous disturbances of affect and psychomotor speed? This important issue, ie, making distinction between schizophrenia and affective illness, is dealt with below.
The second point concerns the use of treatment response as a diagnostic indicator. At the time of discharge, 90% of the sample had responded to the treatment. The details of this treatment and the length of time of hospitalization do not appear from the study. Treatment response is of course not a part of the formal descriptive definition of bipolar disorder or schizophrenia (although it may be useful in other contexts).
Brockington and Colleagues (1978)
The report 19 is a large-scale comparison of 10 systems of diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia, with one definition based solely on the presence of FRS. It is concluded, that FRS are weak in all areas of prediction (outcome, final diagnosis, and social function). The primary objection to this study is that the main indicator of a ''true'' schizophrenia was a criterion of poor clinical and social outcome. The different competing diagnostic criteria were compared by the number of schizophrenia casesthey generated, interrater reliability, and by the level of concordance with the other criteria or with outcome. Final lifetime diagnosis was obtained by the review of both the original interviews and the follow-up data. Forty-five patients (out of a total of 262) were given a lifetime diagnosis of schizophrenia (leaving out residual schizophrenia). Thirty-eight patients exhibited FRS at admission and 28 of these obtained a final lifetime diagnosis of schizophrenia, while 10 patients did not. The lifetime diagnoses of these patients are not given. The consensus criteria are not specified, but the clinical and social outcome is strongly emphasized. Yet, unfavorable outcome can only be characteristic, not diagnostic, of schizophrenia.
Discussion and Comments
Examining Schneiderian FRS is associated with several problems at the practical level as well as at a more overarching epistemological level.
A fundamental issue in the reviewed studies is the question of validity of psychiatric diagnosis in general and of schizophrenia in particular. There is a lack of explicit realization that the diagnosis of schizophrenia is based on a certain convention and not on its purported essential nature. Thus, one study examines a group of psychotic patients who are dichotomized by Feighner diagnostic criteria into schizophrenia and nonschizophrenia and then compared with respect to the prevalence of FRS, which are found in both groups. The authors consider the Feighner criteria as the ''golden standard'' for diagnosing schizophrenia 43 but fail to realize that Feighner criteria, useful as they may be in many contexts, are not descriptive of the essence of schizophrenia. In fact, the ''nonschizophrenia'' group contains individuals, which might have been diagnosed with schizophrenia by other, equally rational diagnostic systems. Others examine the relation between the presence of FRS and outcome. Bland and Orn 26 attempt to substantiate a joint hypothesis that true schizophrenia has poor outcome and FRS predict poor outcome, and therefore, the patients with FRS must have a poor outcome. Again, the problem is that the diagnosis of schizophrenia is a convention and not all schizophrenics have poor outcome.
Unclear definitions of the FRS is another widespread problem in the studies; neither Schneider nor Present State Examination (PSE) offer very precise definitions of FRS. Consequently, different explications of FRS are possible, and if the precise definitions are not articulated, it is difficult to compare the conclusions of the studies.
It could be assumed that the diagnostic development of the 1990's would yield a more homogeneous picture of the FRS. But a comparison of the reports dichotomized into those published prior to 1994 and those published later does not yield a more uniform pattern of results.
The distinction between schizophrenia and mood disorders causes great difficulties. The ICD-10 and DSM-IV both require that affective symptoms are excluded before the diagnosis of schizophrenia can be made. Yet Schneider proposed that the presence of FRS in the absence of an organic cause was sufficient for the diagnosis of schizophrenia. Some of the studies examine bipolar patients and find that these patients have FRS, hence the interpretation that the FRS are not specific for schizophrenia. 12, 48 In DSM-IV, schizophrenia is defined by the presence of characteristic signs and symptoms, impaired social and occupational functioning, persistence of symptoms for more than 6 months and exclusion of schizoaffective and mood disorder. The latter criterion is further specified: No major depressive, manic, or mixed episodes have occurred concurrently with the activephase symptoms, or if so, the duration of these have been relatively brief compared with the active or residual periods. Yet, as schizophrenia is frequently accompanied with excitation or withdrawal symptoms and affective disturbances, this exclusion criterion makes the differentiation between these 2 major psychotic illnesses quite fragile conceptually as well as pragmatically. In a sense, the specification of the characteristic symptoms, including FRS, becomes less important than the affirmation of mood symptoms.
This confusion is also found in the ICD-10. Here, the diagnoses are ordered hierarchically and schizophrenia precedes affective disorder in the classification. The FRS are specified in the operational criteria as being of special importance for the diagnosis of schizophrenia. Yet it is stated that ''the diagnosis of schizophrenia should not be made in the presence of extensive, depressive, or manic symptoms unless it is clear that schizophrenic symptoms antedated the affective disturbance.'' This undermines the hierarchical structure of the system and, even more importantly (as was the case with the DSM-IV), it deprives the clinician of the support, implicitly intended, from the symptoms of specific importance like the FRS. However, in 40% of the patients, 3 of the 10 most frequent subjective symptoms antedating schizophrenia are affective: restlessness, depression, and anxiety, and many qualify for a full depressive syndrome. 51, 53 Should these patients be diagnosed as depressed the rest of their lives?
It is also essential to clarify how we conceive the FRS, what is their phenomenological nature, and what method is adequate to assess their presence and diagnostic importance. This specific issue is part of a more general theoretical problem concerning the nature of psychiatric symptoms and signs. 55 It exceeds the scope of this review; here, we will only indicate certain epistemological problems associated with the FRS.
First, it is necessary to emphasize that the descriptions of FRS provided by the CP are casual, vague, and do not live up to the rigorousness of ''operational criteria'' or ''protocol statements'' (ie precursors of what we today call operational definitions). This laconic form remained unchanged in the PSE. 2 As an example, see the descriptions (table 2) of thoughts being spoken aloud and thought broadcasting as presented in CP and PSE. One reason for the sketchiness of the CP descriptions was that Schneider was not teaching psychiatrists about the symptoms (these phenomena were already described in ample detail in the French [De Clerambault, Janet] and German literature); rather, he seeked to emphasize their diagnostic value. The debate concerning diagnostic efficacy of FRS in the German-speaking psychiatry began shortly after the publication of CP. Some critics noted that the FRS were only diagnostic of schizophrenia on the condition of a simultaneous ''phenomenological leverage,'' 56 A schizophrenic man stated that his thoughts were 'taken from me years ago by a parish council' On the same level as thought withdrawal, we find other kinds of influences at work on the thoughts. Thoughts are ascribed to other people who intrude their thoughts upon the patient. Equally important are the thoughts that are no longer private but shared by others, the whole town or the whole world.'' ''The diffusion of thoughts is illustrated by a schizophrenic shopkeeper who said: 'People see what I am thinking; you could not prove it, but I just know it is so (.)' 'If I think of anything, at once those opposite me know it and it is embarrassing'.'' The Present State Examination, Cooper et al 54(p208) The Present State Examination, Cooper et al 54(p208) ''Thoughts are stopping unexpectedly so that there are none left Designated as ''thought broadcast'': ''Hears one's thoughts ''spoken'' but not broadcast. Subject must really hear them aloud in his head. In more severe cases, the thoughts are transferred or broadcast so others can share them'' (see Schneider's ''diffusion'' in the opposite column). ''Thought echo is rated when thoughts are repeated or echoed or commented by other thoughts'' (no hallucinations).
Are thoughts put into your head which you know are not your own?'' (if the thoughts are considered as nonalien, but eg, as 'subconscious', the score should be only 1).
''Thoughts taken out of the head as though some external person or force were removing them.''
No definition of thought broadcast as thought diffusion; instead included a delusion of ''thoughts being read.'' Note: ''Psychopathological concepts are evolved from observation and must always be measured and tested against observed facts. It is reasonable to expect that they should account in essentials for the clinical data which are their point of departure, and which give them their purpose and meaning (.). No one, however, will expect theoretical classifications to settle every individual case unerringly (.). The psychiatrist who for this reason thinks theoretical efforts are useless is abandoning all hope of a scientific psychopathology.'' Schneider.
1(p38- 39) ie, on the condition of eliciting these symptoms in a psychopathological context (''lifting the symptoms to a phenomenological completeness''). Explained very briefly: the critics did not consider the FRS as symptoms-ie, they could not be considered or defined in isolation from each other, as singly self-sufficient, atomic thinglike indicators of underlying brain pathology or diagnosis (in the way that a smoke may indicate a fire). Rather, they were considered as phenomena, ie, as meaningfully interrelated facets of a more comprehensive and characteristic Gestalt-change in the patient's experience (field of consciousness) and existence. 57 Thus, in order to assess, eg, a presence of thought insertion and its diagnostic significance, one has to obtain a comprehensive picture of the patient's subjective world, a requirement that goes beyond the apparent validity provided by a ''yes-no answer'' (or any other single, underdetermined proposition) uttered by a patient in response to a question. 58 There is a need for a phenomenological adequate psychiatric interview, 58, 59 eg, following the lines described by Jaspers, 60 because only such an approach may grasp affinities between disparate FRS and apprehend their organizing Gestalt, which is constitutive of their diagnostic significance. Unfortunately, the only in-depth contemporary psychopathological study of the FRS is not (yet) available in an English translation. 61 The ''phenomenological leverage'' was mentioned by Schneider himself, albeit in a rather lateral and cryptic manner: ''[the FRS] signify a radical qualitative change in the thought processes as described by Gruhle'' [Schneider 1(p100) ; italics added]. Although this prudent and important remark of Schneider's was not lost in translation, it passed unnoticed, failing to stimulate relevant curiosity and reflection. What Gruhle (and several others) had described was a transformation of the form of consciousness with a diminished sense of self-presence. Gruhle used the expression of ''Schizophrene Grundstimmung'', ie, a trait-like ''frame of mind,'' whose core feature is de-ipseisation (ipseity = direct or immediate, prereflective self-awareness of experience; from Latin: ipse = self, itself), with insufficient sense of ''mineness'' of experience and increasing distance or split between the sense of self and the sense of experience. 62 Recent empirical studies with a phenomenological orientation support these original observations [Moller and Husby, . In summary, Schneider, his contemporaries, and more recent phenomenological contributions 57, 61, 66 did not consider the FRS as atomic symptoms but as 2 groups of phenomena: passivity experiences and hallucinations, with certain phenomenological overlaps (as described by Loftus et al 67 
).
A call for a ''phenomenological leverage'' points to several problematic aspects of their diagnostic role, of which, we will mention only one. Thus, the FRS are diagnostically useful only in a patient without clouding or other degradation of consciousness (eg, with a perplexity due to severe emotional turmoil, strong fear or anxiety, extreme mood, or psychomotor swings) simply because the trait-like, formal alterations of experience and consciousness can only be meaningfully assessed in a patient whose consciousness is in a state of ''composure'' (Schneider 1 ). Upon this background, it is easier to see the various sources of disagreement between the studies: (1) including or excluding acute patients with potential degradation of consciousness, (2) assessing or not the phenomenological context, (3) assessing patients in different stages of their illness evolution, and (4) differential emphasis on mood symptoms and history of psychiatric symptoms.
Conclusion
The reviewed studies do not allow for either a reconfirmation or a rejection of Schneider's claims about FRS. Both DSM-IV and ICD-10 emphasize FRS to a degree that is not supported by the empirical evidence. The simplistic way in which the FRS are conceived in the operational diagnostic systems and in many of the commonly used rating scales tends to add to the confusion. When assessing FRS, the phenomenological approach is essential for the understanding of the altered consciousness of the patient. Until the status of FRS is clarified in depth, we suggest that the FRS, as these are currently defined, should be de-emphasized in the next revisions of our diagnostic systems. In future studies, it is necessary to include a homogenous group of patients across a wide spectrum of diagnoses and perform extensive phenomenological interviews.
